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Incoherent State: The Controversy
over Kurdish Naming in Turkey
Senem Aslan
1 In 2002, seven parents were taken to the criminal court in Dicle, a town in the province
of  Diyarbakır,  for  giving  Kurdish  names  to  their  children1.  According  to  the
prosecutor’s  claim,  these  names  were  the  code  names  used  by  militants  of  the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and, therefore, were against the Civil Registration Law,
which stipulated that names which do not conform to national culture, moral norms,
customs and traditions and which offend the public could not be given to children. The
case was brought to the attorney’s  attention by the Diyarbakır gendarmerie,  which
investigated the records at the Registration Office and came up with a list of Kurdish
names  after  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  sent  a  secret  circular,  warning  local
administrators about an increase in Kurdish naming.2 Ironically, the court was presided
over  by  a  female  judge  with  a  Kurdish  name,  Şirvan.  During  the  hearings,  the
prosecutor drew attention to a report sent from the Turkish Language Society, stating
that the names ‘did not conform to Turkish naming habits.’ In fact, some of the names
in the list,  such as Serhat and Baran were commonly used in Turkey.  The families’
attorney  underlined  that  the  prosecutor  did  not  have  the  right  to  bring  name
annulment cases to court. In the end, the judge recognized the attorney’s claim and
dismissed the case due to procedural reasons.3 
2 In Turkey, Kurdish names constitute one of the main issues of cultural contestation
between state authorities and the Kurds. A Kurdish name ban is widely cited by many
scholars as an example of the Turkish state’s repressive policies of assimilation and is
condemned by human rights  activists.  This  article  explains  why,  despite  expanding
legal  spaces  for  expressions  of  Kurdish  identity,  the  issue  of  Kurdish  naming  has
become more contentious since the late 1980s. Beginning with the 1990s, the Turkish
government gave signs of relaxing limitations on the expressions of Kurdish culture.
The  Kurdish  language  ban  was  lifted  in  1991  and  many  Turkish  politicians  and
members of the government increasingly acknowledged the need to recognize Kurdish
cultural rights. Mainstream newspapers, which had largely avoided writing about the
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Kurds  in  previous  periods,  started  to  refer  to  the  Kurdish  issue  more  frequently.
Political opening continued in the 2000s. In the post-2000 period, as part of an effort to
meet European Union (EU) membership criteria, the parliament passed laws that eased
restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in the media and educational domains.
Consequently, broadcasting in Kurdish in public and private radio and TV stations and
teaching Kurdish in private institutions became legal. 
3 It was, however, in these two decades that state authorities and parents trying to give
their  children Kurdish names began challenging each other more heatedly.  Parents
encountered problems in their attempts to register Kurdish names at the registration
offices and were sometimes harassed by authorities. Some Kurds refused to register
their children unless they were allowed to give Kurdish names and faced administrative
problems in the following years. Consequently, Kurdish naming has become subject to
numerous police investigations and court cases. Why do we see an increased contention
over naming between Kurdish activists and Turkish state authorities at times when the
space for expression of minority identities was expanded? My answer to this question is
twofold, calling attention to the mutually transformative relationship between state
behavior and activist strategies.      
4 Part of the answer to this question, I argue, relates to incoherent state responses to the
issue  of  Kurdish  naming.  A  detailed  analysis  of  the  naming  controversy  in  Turkey
suggests that the ban on Kurdish names was not an absolute and permanent rule that
remained valid at all times across similar cases. Instead, different parts of the Turkish
state formulated and implemented different and contradictory responses in dealing
with the issue of naming. Particularly, I call attention to the role of local state officials,
such  as  registrars,  public  prosecutors,  judges,  police,  and  gendarmerie,  in  the
escalation of naming controversy. The local bureaucracy’s insistence on the Kurdish
name ban, despite the consistent rulings of the Court of Cassation [Yargıtay] against
this practice, denoted a subtle contestation among state actors over how to solve the
Kurdish problem. 
5 Second, increased contention over naming was a consequence of changing strategies of
Kurdish  activism.  The  naming controversy  suggests  that  earlier  policies  of
Turkification have created their counterparts within Kurdish activism, which in turn
has made negotiation and compromise more difficult for both sides. Kurdification of
names increasingly became a tool for the creation of Kurdish nationhood and a symbol
for  protest  against  the  Turkish  state.  Especially  in  the  post-2000  period,  Kurdish
activists sought to construct unique Kurdish names through the creation or revival of
names of Kurdish linguistic origin and to mobilize Kurds at large to adopt these names
to distinguish themselves from the general  Turkish public.  The recent insistence of
activists to register Kurdish names with letters that do not exist in the official alphabet
and the  support  of  the  PKK  in  such  efforts  strengthened  official  perceptions  that
Kurdish  naming  practices  were  more  a  tactic  of  constructing  an  exclusivist
understanding of Kurdishness than an effort at cultural preservation and thus met with
official  resistance.  In  this  article,  I  call  attention  to  the  mutually  transformative
relationship between states and minority strategies. The Kurdish movement did not
remain static in the face of the Turkish state’s policies. It evolved and responded in
ways that altered the dynamics of cultural and legal conflict.  
6 This  case study on the naming controversy suggests  a  need for  a  more contextual,
dynamic,  and  relational  understanding  of  state  behavior.  Most  analyses  of  state-
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Kurdish relations depict the Turkish state as a unified and coherent actor that imposes
a set of rigid and uncompromising nation-building policies to transform the citizens
into one, specific understanding of Turkishness.4 Such assumption reifies the state as
an  integrated  unit  and  ignores  the  dissonance  and  confrontations  that  take  place
between  different  state  institutions  and  actors.  This  article  draws  on  the  ‘state  in
society’ approach (Migdal et. al. 1994, 2001) and calls attention to the non-monolithic
nature of the Turkish state. As Hansen and Stepputat (2002: 16) suggest, ‘As modern
forms of governmentality penetrate and shape human life in unprecedented ways, the
practices and sites of governance have also become ever more dispersed, diversified,
and fraught with internal inconsistencies and contradictions.’  Such heterogeneity of
state responses has a lot to do with the different contexts in which state institutions
operate.  Understanding  how  states  respond  to  an  issue  requires  going  beyond  a
procedural understanding of policy making to an analysis of how state institutions and
actors interpret and recreate policies at different levels. 
7 In  the  first  section,  I  provide  a  brief  discussion  of  why  states  interfere  in  naming
practices along with a short  history of  the Turkish state’s  policy of  naming.  In the
second section, I briefly discuss the legal restrictions on Kurdish cultural expressions
after the start  of  the armed conflict  in the 1980s and 1990s.  In the third section,  I
examine how the naming issue became more contentious at the end of the 1980s with
the escalation of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military. I show
how  state  agents,  particularly  local  officials  such  as  registrars,  public  prosecutors,
judges, police, and gendarmerie who worked in the conflict-ridden Kurdish areas came
to perceive any expression of Kurdishness as a political symbol in support of the PKK. I
also examine the decisions of the Turkish Court of Cassation, which is the appeals court
of last resort, with regards to personal naming practices and discuss how the local state
institutions frequently ignored its consistent rulings against the ban on Kurdish names.
I argue that the local bureaucracy’s insistence on the ban, despite the rulings of the
Court  of  Cassation,  played  a  crucial  role  in  instigating  the  naming  conflict  and
facilitating the growing politicization of personal naming practices among the Kurds.
In the final, fourth section, I discuss this cultural contention within the context of the
EU reforms and the increasing Kurdification campaign of the Kurdish movement. 
 
I. The Politics of Naming for State and Nation-Building
 
8 States’ interference in personal naming practices is inextricably linked to modern state
formation  and  establishment  of  direct  rule.  Collection  of  taxes,  imposition  of
conscription,  institutionalizing  a  standard  legal  system  and  property  regime,  and
establishing a system of universal  citizenship entail  expansion of state control over
daily lives of its citizens. As Scott et al. (2002) emphasize states’ efforts to impose direct
rule over their populations necessitates increased social legibility: ‘The modern state-
by  which  we  mean  a  state  whose  ideology  encompasses  large-scale  plans  for the
improvement of the population’s welfare- requires at least two forms of legibility to be
able to achieve its mission. First, it requires the capacity to locate citizens uniquely and
unambiguously. Second, it needs standardized information that will allow it to create
aggregate  statistics  about  property,  income,  health,  demography,  productivity,  etc.’
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(Scott et. al. 2002: 10). One of the ways states increase the legibility of their populations
is through assigning each individual a fixed and hereditary surname. 
9 The Surname Law that was passed in 1934 in Turkey indicates such state efforts to
identify each individual as a legal person. This law required each citizen to adopt a
family name. It also brought certain restrictions on the types of surnames that can be
adopted. These restrictions suggested that the state’s aim to impose a surname law
went beyond a purely administrative motive. The Turkish state also considered the law
as an agent of social  makeover to mold citizens into a homogeneous,  national unit.
First, the law was used as a tool for detribalization. The Republican regime considered
tribes  as  signs  of  backwardness  and  tribal  leaders  as  centers  of  power  that  could
challenge  the  expansion of  state  authority  in  the  countryside.  Tribes were  seen as
communities that stood in the way between states and citizens; they were obstacles to
establishing direct state rule.5 The Surname Law forbade surnames that were related to
tribes.  Hüseyin Koca (1998:  132)  writes  that  sons of  some tribal  leaders  were given
different last names than their fathers’ and that each son received a separate last name
to break up the tribal structure, which was quite strong especially in the Kurdish and
Arabic-speaking  areas  of  Eastern  and  Southeastern  Anatolia.6 Nevertheless,  no
systematic data is available on how extensive this practice was. At best, the practice
had  been  uneven  and  incomplete.  Sometimes  large  landowning  families  and  tribes
could keep their established names, by which they were known if they were powerful
enough to influence the local officials.7
10 Second, the Surname Law was meant to foster a sense of Turkishness within society and
prohibited  surnames that  were  related to  foreign ethnicities  and nations.  Policy  of
naming has been a conventional tool for states to construct a new national tradition
and identity. It can be a mechanism for ethnic segregation or assimilation (Scassa 1996:
174-175). Domestically, Turkish policy aimed at the latter. The Surname Law was a tool
for  the  creation  of  Turkish  national  identity  and  an  ethnically  indistinguishable
citizenry. Nevertheless, at a global scale, it also intended to draw clear-cut boundaries
of Turkishness, separating Turkey from the other Muslim nations. The new language
policy of the early Turkish Republic promoted the development of purified Turkish to
establish a radical break with the Ottoman past and to construct a secular national
identity.8 A  regulatory  statue  on  surnames  that  was  prepared  by  the  Council  of
Ministers after the law required surnames to be taken from words of Turkish origin. 
11 Although there was no legal requirement for the Turkification of first names, personal
naming practices were also influenced by the new language policy. There was already a
media campaign before the Surname Law that promoted the replacement of personal
and geographical names of Arabic and Persian origin with pure Turkish names (Sadoğlu
2003:  257).  Unlike  non-Muslims,  who conventionally  used different  names than the
Muslims at the time, there was no distinct separation between Kurdish and Turkish
names. Both ethnic communities used to give traditional Muslim names, which were
predominantly Arabic and Persian, to their children. With the new Turkification trend,
both Turks and Kurds increasingly began to give pure Turkish names to their children.
Naci Kutlay (1997: 311-312), a prominent Kurdish intellectual and activist, notes that
during the first few decades of the Republic, many Kurds, especially those who lived in
urban areas, gave their children pure Turkish names and names that were reminiscent
of Central Asia or Turkish history. Bulliet (1978: 494) writes that the use of Turkish
names  slowly  but  steadily  increased  among  the  population  at  large  since  the
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establishment of the Republic. Especially non-Muslim minorities felt more pressure to
Turkify their names in order not to encounter any discrimination. Türköz (2007) writes
that as recognized minorities, the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek communities were not
legally required to change their names, but this was not made explicit in the law. Many
non-Muslim citizens ‘chose to divest their names of explicit markers of their ethnic
affiliation. Changes in minority names were made in several ways: by cutting off an
ending that marked the name as ethnic, by maintaining one syllable of the old name
and adapting the name to Turkish, by adopting a fairly innocuous name such as Çiçek,
or, in one case, a complete translation of a name’ (Türköz 2007: 901). 
12 The Turkification trend also paved the way for a large-scale toponymical engineering.9
 Not only non-Turkish geographical  names that suggested the existence of different
ethnic communities within Turkey’s  boundaries but also those that contained some
reference to particular religious or traditional structures and to the old regime began
to  be  changed  in  the  early  Turkish  Republic.  To  cite  an  example,  a  village  named
Kürtşeyh [Kurdish Sheikh] was divested of its ethnic connotation and took a neutral
name of Çiçektepe [Flowerhill]. Over the years until 1980, the names of 67 percent of
subdistricts  and  63  percent  of  villages  were  changed  in  Southeastern  and  Eastern
Turkey10. This was followed by another wave of renaming during the military rule after
the 1980 coup. Renaming of places emphasized Turkish claims of ownership to these
geographic areas and sought to recreate their inhabitants’ sense of space in accordance
with the official nationalist ideology. Most importantly, through acts of renaming the
Turkish state underlined the extent of its power over its citizens. 
13 As Scassa (1996: 172) discusses, states regulate the use of surnames more closely than
personal names because fixation of surnames is crucial for modern state building as it
helps institutionalize a standard legal system and property regime. Thus, individuals
cannot change their surnames as easily as they can change their first names. States’
interest in the regulation of personal names, nevertheless, has been more sporadic and
contextual. In Turkey, too, the state’s intervention in the parents’ choice of names for
their  children has been uneven and directly  correlated with efforts  to  invigorate a
common national identity. Official restrictions in personal naming practices emerged
at times when perceptions of threat against national unity increased within the state
circles. It was after the 1980s, with the escalation of the armed conflict between the
Kurdish insurgency and the Turkish army, that state officials came to be more selective
with regard to personal naming practices.   
14 The first attempt to regulate the choice of first names came with the 1972 Registration
Law. Article 16/4 of the law stipulated that names which do not conform to national
culture, moral norms, customs and traditions and which offend the public could not be
given to children. It was left to the discretion of officials working at the registration
offices to decide whether a name ran counter to the ‘national culture’ or not. Sezgin
Tanrıkulu,  a  prominent  human  rights  attorney  based  in  Diyarbakır,11 argued  that
before  the  military  coup  in  1980,  Kurds  could  have  given  Kurdish  names  to  their
children. He called attention to the prevalence of many Kurdish names such as Berfin,
Helin, Hazal, Baran, and Kendal, which could have been officially registered. 12 Some of
the  Kurdish  activists  whom  I  interviewed  confirmed  this  and  pointed  out  that
negotiating with state officials working in the registration offices over a Kurdish name
could be possible before the 1980s. A disagreement over a name was usually resolved
during such negotiation, without having to go to a judicial process.13 
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II. 1980s and 1990s: Official Restrictions on Kurdish
Cultural Expressions
15 The  1980  military  coup  has  become  a  turning  point  in  state-Kurdish  relations  in
Turkey,  and  it  was  after  this  date  that  the  issue  of  naming  became  increasingly
politicized.  The emergence of Kurdish groups that advocated self-determination and
the formation of the PKK at the end of the 1970s convinced the military that separatism
was an imminent and a serious threat that should be stopped, at any cost. The military
rule that lasted from 1980 to 1983 interpreted any manifestation of Kurdishness, from
speaking the Kurdish language to listening to Kurdish music,  as a challenge against
national integrity and did not tolerate it. The repressive measures that the military rule
undertook  during  this  period  played  a  significant  role  in  the  radicalization  of  the
Kurdish  masses  (Bozarslan  2001:  46-47).  The  state  policies  of  this  period  were  also
crucial in politicizing the use of the Kurdish language and bringing the language issue
to the core of cultural contestation that would last for the years to come. For instance,
the infamous Law 2932, which came into effect towards the end of the military rule in
1983, banned the use of the Kurdish language in public and private.14 The second article
of  the law stated,  ‘No language can be used for the explication,  dissemination,  and
publication of ideas other than the first official language of countries, recognized by
the Turkish state.’ The law was carefully formulated to make Kurdish its sole target but
never mentioned the word ‘Kurdish,’ as it would mean the official acknowledgement of
the  existence  of  the  Kurdish  language.  The  law  also  prohibited  the  spread  of  any
language, other than Turkish, as the mother tongue. Until its repeal in 1991, the law
was used to justify probations, interrogations, and litigations against those who spoke,
sang, or published in Kurdish.15 
16 It  was in  the contentious environment of  the 1980s  that  Kurdish names have been
increasingly seen as subversive of national culture and banned at the local registration
offices.  According  to  Sezgin  Tanrıkulu,  the  military  regime,  which  was  in  power
between 1980 and 1983, sent a list  of Kurdish names to the registration offices and
banned  these  names.16 Transition  to  multi-party  politics  in  1983  did  not  lead  to  a
relaxation of the policies restricting Kurdish cultural practices. The emergence of the
PKK and the start of the Kurdish armed resistance increased the state’s intolerance
towards  expressions  of  Kurdishness.  The  armed  conflict  also  led  to  a  gradual
politicization  of  Kurdish  cultural  elements,  such  as  music,  dress,  language,  and
celebrations,  which curtailed the state’s  willingness  to  relax cultural  measures.  For
instance,  a  genre  of  Kurdish  music  developed that  glorified  and propagated armed
struggle and self-determination. Newroz, known as the New Year that marks the first
day  of  spring  around  March  21,  became  a  more  public  and  political  event  that
symbolized Kurdish resistance against state repression. The PKK also used Newroz as a
means  to  propagate  and  conduct  violence.  Its  celebrations  led  to  violent  conflicts
between state security forces and Kurdish activists from time to time (Yanık 2006: 287).
Such politicization strengthened the hardliners’ position within the state, particularly
the military’s. The hardliners tended to see the Kurdish cultural demands as a subtle
prelude  to  autonomy and  eventually  territorial  secession.  Although the  end  of  the
1980s brought a debate among politicians, members of civil society organizations, and
intellectuals  about  how to  solve  the  Kurdish  problem through non-military  means,
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relaxation of legal restrictions on Kurdish cultural expressions proved to be a difficult
matter.17
17 By  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  the  government  began  to  relax  some  of  the  major
restrictions on expressions of Kurdish culture. The infamous Law 2932, which banned
the Kurdish language in public and private, was lifted in April 1991.18 The following
December,  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Erdal  İnönü argued  that  Kurdish  citizens  should
enjoy their cultural identity in full. On March 1991, the Minister of Culture issued a
directive allowing for the celebration of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year, all over the
country. The following year the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel announced that he
recognized  the  Kurdish  ethnic  presence.  President  Turgut  Özal,  in  particular,  took
important steps in an attempt to solve the problem through non-military means. In
January  1990,  he  approved  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  European  Court  of
Human Rights, which since then has become a crucial appeal mechanism for Kurdish
activists.  He  also  announced  that  he  was  partly  Kurdish,  argued  for  Kurdish
broadcasting  on  state  television,  tried  to  form  informal  contacts  with  the  Kurdish
leaders, stated that a federal system could solve the Kurdish problem, and advocated
the preparation of an amnesty law for the PKK fighters (Ataman 2002). 
18 Such liberalization also had an effect  on bringing the Kurdish issue into the public
debate. As Somer (2004: 246) states, ‘Beginning in 1991, not only did the number of
articles escalate drastically,  but also a large percentage of the articles began to use
‘Kurd,’  indicating  that  the  discursive  categories  that  the  journalists  were  using  in
describing similar events were in transition.’  In a country in which officials  almost
never used the word ‘Kurd’ and identified the Kurdish issue as a problem of regional
backwardness or terrorism, these were drastic changes.  As Yeğen (2007:  137) notes,
Kurdish resistance pushed Turkish nationalists to publicly recognize the existence of a
separate  Kurdish  identity,  which  they  had  denied  for  decades.  This  recognition,
nevertheless, was uneven at different levels of the state. In other words, there was no
integrated state response towards such liberalization. Attempts to reduce tensions by
easing the restrictions on Kurdish linguistic and cultural practices failed to produce the
desired impact on the ground. Resistance to cultural policy change by state officials
working at the local levels has played a considerable role in instigating further cultural
and symbolic conflict. For instance, even after Law 2932 was lifted in 1991, most of the
restrictions on the use of  the Kurdish language remained de facto in force,  largely
because the abolition of the law did not influence the behavior of the local state cadres.
19 
 
III. Mixed State Responses to Kurdish Naming 
19 An  analysis  of  the  Kurdish  naming  controversy  since  the  1980s  demonstrates  the
incoherent nature of state policies in Turkey. The naming controversy underlines how
parts  of  the  state  –the  military,  bureaucracy,  political  parties,  government,  and
judiciary along with their representatives at the lower levels of the state in local areas–
formulated and implemented different and sometimes conflicting responses in their
attempts to deal with the Kurdish problem. The continuing controversy over Kurdish
naming  seems  in  part  to  be  due  to  local  officials’  reluctance  to  recognize  Kurdish
names,  and,  more  generally,  their  reluctance  to  make  concessions  to  the  idea  of
‘Kurdish  rights.’  Specifically,  it  was  the  local  registrars,  public  prosecutors,  judges,
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police,  and  gendarmerie  who  played  significant  roles  in  escalating  the  naming
controversy. 
20 In some cases, Kurdish names came to be targets of the local police and prosecutor. In
February 1987, for instance, the weekly news magazine Nokta reported that the Office
of the Public Prosecutor in Bitlis brought twelve people to court, charging them with
giving Kurdish names to their  children.  The judicial  process started after the Bitlis
chief of police conducted a survey of the names registered in the public registration
office  and  wrote  a  report  about  local  naming  practices  to  the  office  of  the  public
prosecutor. In this report the police chief wrote that the majority of the population
living in Bitlis conserved their local characteristics, that they continued to speak their
local  language,  and that  they gave their  children Kurdish names.  Before the public
prosecutor in Bitlis charged the parents, he asked for an opinion from the Ministry of
the Interior. As a result, the Ministry prepared a committee of experts composed of two
administrators from the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs. The
report  written by  the  committee  underlined that  the  names  were  not  Turkish  and
added, ‘Over the long term, the names given to children are very important for our
national unity and social structure. Therefore, names given to children should have a
character that unites society.’ The report also drew attention to the Article 16/4 of the
Registration Law, which stipulated that names which do not conform to the national
culture, moral norms, customs, and traditions and which offend the public cannot be
given to children. As a result of this report from the Ministry of the Interior, the public
prosecutor applied to the court to annul the Kurdish names. After 10 months of the
first  hearing  in  court,  the  judges  decided  to  drop the  case  for  procedural  reasons,
claiming that public prosecutors could not open court cases to annul registered names.
This ruling was in conformity with a previous decision of the Court of Cassation, which
stipulated  that  a  name’s  non-Turkish  origin  could  not  be  a  justification  for  its
annulment. 20 Neither the decision of the court in Bitlis nor the earlier decision of the
Court of Cassation, however, could serve as precedents and prevent name annulment
cases from being opened in the Kurdish regions in the following years. 
21 Often it was the officials in public registration offices in Kurdish cities who played a
critical  role  in  instigating  the  contestations  over  naming.  In  1988,  the  registration
office  in  Midyat  issued a  criminal  complaint  about  a  parent  who gave his  children
Kurdish names, Valat and Baver. According to the registrars, these names were not in
conformity with the national culture, customs, and traditions and, therefore, should be
erased from the registration records. The civil court of Midyat asked an opinion from
the Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs.
This  time  the  General  Directorate’s  interpretation  conflicted  with  its  report  in  the
previous year. While it underlined that the names were not of Turkish origin, it called
attention to the Lausanne Treaty and stated that  people who belonged to minority
groups in Turkey had the right to give foreign names to their children. Accordingly, the
family  in  question  could  be  considered  as  belonging  to  a  minority  and  that  the
children’s names were common among people who constituted a minority community
in Eastern Turkey. This was one of the very rare instances that an official institution
recognized the Kurdish population as a minority in Turkey. In fact, the opinion was
based on an incorrect interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty, which recognized only the
non-Muslim Turkish citizens as minority groups. In accordance with the answer sent
from the Ministry of the Interior, the local civil court of Midyat ruled that the Kurdish
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names of the children could not be changed.21 While the decision of the Midyat court
paralleled  the  decision  of  the  court  in  Bitlis  a  year  ago,  its  legal  justification  was
different.  
22 A  survey  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  [Yargıtay]  decisions  concerning  naming  clearly
shows the dissonance between state institutions at different levels and how the issue
became more controversial in the Kurdish localities in the 1990s. In Turkey, the Court
of Cassation is the court of appeals of last resort and reviews the decisions of the lower
courts to ensure standardization in the legal practice. If the Court of Cassation does not
agree with a decision, it annuls the decision of the lower court and remands the case to
the  lower  court.  If  the  lower  court  insists  on  its  previous  decision,  the  General
Assembly of the Court of Cassation concludes appellate review on the lower court’s
judgment and makes the final  decision on the case.22 Since the 1980s,  the Court  of
Cassation’s decisions with regards to taking non-Turkish names have been consistently
liberal. In all the cases about naming, Kurdish or other foreign names,23 the court ruled
that  individuals  were  free  to  take any name,  unless  the  meaning of  the  name was
insulting,  humiliating,  or  profane.  Such  rulings,  however,  were  hardly  taken  into
consideration by the local bureaucratic circles in the conflict-ridden Kurdish areas. For
state  agents  who  served  in  the  local  areas  of  the  conflict,  banning  Kurdish  names
became a way to assert state authority over the very private details of Kurds’ lives, at
times when many such officials felt their authority was being threatened.
23 In 1990, for instance, the Court of Cassation overruled a decision of a lower civil court,
which ruled that the parents involved should annul the Kurdish name, ‘Berivan,’ that
they had given their child and registered officially. The Court of Cassation rejected the
ruling based on several  reasons.  It  ruled that,  procedurally,  name annulment cases
could not be opened in courts either by public prosecutors or by registration offices but
that only individuals could apply to courts in order to change their names. The court
also stated that, since naming their children is a right of parents, no individual could be
stripped of  a  name by a  court  decision according to the main principles  of  human
rights. In addition, it  found the lower court’s explanation inadequate as to why the
name, ‘Berivan,’ did not conform to the national culture, customs, and traditions.24
24 During the 1990s, the Court of Cassation also issued rulings on a number of cases that
involved individuals  who wanted to change their  Turkish names to Kurdish.  In the
1990s, with the intensification of the armed conflict and the popular spread of Kurdish
nationalism,  more  Kurds  wanted  to  take  distinctive  Kurdish  names  and  used  the
Turkish  court  system  to  seek  their  rights.  The  lower  courts  in  general  were  not
empathetic to such demands and rejected the plaintiffs’ demands on the grounds that
the names were not Turkish. A fewer number of these plaintiffs could appeal their cases
to the Court of Cassation. In all these cases, the court of last resort consistently ruled
that personal names do not have to be of Turkish origin. For instance, in 1993, the
Court of Cassation cancelled a lower court’s decision that refused a parent’s demand to
change  his  daughter’s  name from ‘Berrin’  into  a  Kurdish  name,  ‘Berfin.’  While  the
lower court refused this demand on the grounds that the name was not Turkish, the
Court of Cassation issued the following ruling: 
25 According to the stated clause of the law, names which do not conform to national
culture, moral norms, customs and traditions and which offend the public cannot be
given. Although the court rejected the case based on this clause, the justification was
based on a photocopy of a text that was written by the chairman of the editorial board
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of the Turkish Language Society [Türk Dil Kurumu] to the Ministry of the Interior. The
aforementioned chairman’s opinion that giving the name ‘Berfin’ to Turkish children
would  be  contrary  to  the  national  culture,  moral  norms,  customs  and  traditions
because of its foreign origins cannot be a justification for a court decision. Why the
word ‘Berfin’ does not conform to our traditions and cannot be given as a name to
Turkish children unlike names that are commonly used in our society such as Pervin,
Nermin,  Şermin,  Berin,  and the  like  should  be  explained thoroughly  in  a  way that
would leave no doubts. 25
26 As a result, the Court of Cassation annulled the decision of the lower court. A year later,
in a very similar case, the Court of Cassation overruled another lower court’s decision
that did not allow a woman to change her name from Songül to Rojda. In this case too,
the lower court based its decision on an opinion that came from the Turkish Language
Society. The Court of Cassation, nevertheless, did not find such opinion adequate and
made a decision based on the meaning of the name and whether or not the individual
was known within the society by the name he/she wanted to take. Unless the meaning
of the name was insulting, defamatory or profane, the Court of Cassation ruled that the
lower courts did not have the right to deny that name to the individual, even though
the name was not Turkish.26  
27 One important controversial case was seen in 1999. A father, whose daughter’s name
was ‘Hatice,’ applied to the Court of Cassation to challenge the lower court’s refusal to
change her name into Kurdish, ‘Mizgin.’ The lower court denied the name change to
Mizgin on the grounds that it did not exist in the Turkish language and stated that it
had Persian (Kurdish) 27 origin. The court referred to the opinion of a Turkish language
and literature professor,  who stated that the name had different and contradictory
meanings,  one  of  which  could  be  considered  insulting.  According  to  the  expert’s
opinion,  the  name  could  mean  ‘guest,  dining  table,  hospitable,  clean,  and  urine,’
depending on the way it was spelled in Persian. One of the reasons why the lower civil
court found the name objectionable was because of its meaning of ‘urine.’ The plaintiff,
however,  stated  that  it  meant  ‘good  news’  in  his  regional  language.  The  Court  of
Cassation found the lower court’s decision appropriate and approved it. Nevertheless,
the decision did not come as a result of a consensus. In his dissenting opinion, one
judge stated that it would not be right to ban the name Mizgin because it was used
commonly in the plaintiff’s region, that people’s lifestyles in this region could not be
considered as distinct from the Turkish culture, and that the plaintiff had the right to
choose  a  lifestyle  from the  milieu  that  he  lived  in.  He  also  called  attention to  the
commonness  of  non-Turkish  names  within  Turkish  society  and  expressed  his
skepticism about the objectivity of the expert’s opinion on the name’s meaning.28 
28 In 2000, the plaintiff applied to the Court of Cassation for a reexamination of the case.
This time the General Assembly of the Court of Cassation found the expert’s opinion
inadequate and subjective. It issued a ruling in favor of the father and stated: 
29 ‘First we should note that the fourth clause of the Article
16 of the Registration Law was not written to purify Turkish
from words of foreign origin but to avert people from giving
names that do not conform to the national culture, moral
norms,  customs  and  traditions.  Eastern  and  Southeastern
Anatolia  is  a  part  of  the  motherland,  where,  not  only  a
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particular  ethnic  group,  but  people  with  different  ethnic
origins live as part of our country’s reality.’
30 The court acknowledged that many of the names used in Turkey are of Arabic and
Persian origin and are ingrained in Turkish culture and traditions. It was convinced by
the  father’s  claim that  the  child  is  commonly  called  as  ‘Mizgin’  by  her  family  and
friends and that the name is commonly used in the region where the family resided. As
its final decision the court ruled that the father had legitimate reasons to change his
daughter’s name.29           
31 As the different court cases indicate, the attitude of different state institutions towards
Kurdish naming was neither monolithic nor consistent. To ensure nationwide unity in
implementation, the Ministry of the Interior sent separate circulars in 1986, 1990, and
1992  stating  that  officials  in  registration  offices  should  register  names  of  parents’
choice.  The  circulars  also  specified  that  if  a  name  was  considered  objectionable,
registrars should first consult the Ministry before informing the public prosecutor.30
Nevertheless,  state  registrars  continued  to  refuse  to  register  Kurdish  names,  the
gendarmerie searched for Kurdish names to inform legal authorities, and local public
prosecutors occasionally filed suits against parents who gave Kurdish names to their
children. In addition, disregarding the highest court’s previous decisions on the issue,
many local courts continued to interpret the Article 16/4 of the Registration Law as a
ban against Kurdish names. For example, in 1998, the Elazığ registration office refused
a father’s demand to register his child’s name as ‘Laşer Rodi.’ The administrative court
of Malatya approved the registration office’s claim two years later. In an interview, the
father stated that although his grandmothers’ Kurdish names were officially registered,
he was not able to register his child’s name for the five years since his birth.31  
32 This study did not try to methodically study the motives for local officials’ relatively
conservative reactions to national-level legal reforms loosening restrictions on Kurdish
cultural expression. However, it is plausible that they resisted national policymakers’
reform efforts for several reasons. First, it is likely that some officials toughened their
behavior because of the harsh circumstances of the war, which made them less tolerant
of cultural practices and symbols of Kurdishness. Some blamed local people for their
distress related to the everyday risks of war, came to associate almost every element of
Kurdish culture with separatism, and thus were little inclined to accommodate Kurdish
cultural expressions or to distinguish between non-politicized and politicized forms of
such expressions. Second, the authority of the military-bureaucratic apparatus on the
ground was strengthened by several governmental decrees during the fight against the
PKK, which increased extralegal and arbitrary practices of local state officials in the
region. Finally, unlike the parliamentarians and the members of the government, these
local officials were largely insulated from international pressures for the improvement
of human rights.
33 As the naming controversy suggests, the Turkish state has not been a coherent and
unitary  actor  in  dealing  with  the  Kurdish  issue.  Instead,  ideological  or  normative
disagreements as well as different contexts in which state actors operated mattered in
the different interpretation and implementation of laws and policies. As Joel Migdal
(2001: 116-117) points out, the state may not generate a single response to an issue or
problem: ‘Rather, its outcomes –the formulation and implementation of its policies– are
a series of  different actions based on the particular calculus of  pressures that each
engaged component of the state faces in its particular environment of action ….The
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outcome can just as likely be a sum of ill-fitting responses that stem from the different
components of the state as they respond to their various arenas of domination and
opposition.’ These contradictory responses that state institutions and actors had given
to similar situations, nevertheless, reduced the credibility of the future policy changes
in the eyes of the Kurds and further contributed to the politicization of the naming
issue. In the post-2000 period, Kurdish naming became a tool for activists to express
their protest against reforms which they perceived to be merely cosmetic.  
 
IV. Post-2000: Further Politicization of Kurdish
Naming 
34 At  the  time  of  the  most  substantial  language  policy  change  in  Turkish  Republican
history,  the  Kurdish  naming  controversy  escalated  once  more  in  the  2000s.  A
substantial transformation in state policy came after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan,
the leader of the PKK, in Kenya in February 1999. After his capture, the PKK, which
renamed itself first as KADEK (the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) and
later as Kongra-Gel (People’s Congress), declared a five-year unilateral ceasefire that
led to a dramatic reduction of armed clashes in the years to come. At the end of 1999,
another  significant  development  took  place.  The  Helsinki  meeting  of  the  European
Council,  held  on  December  1999,  took  key  decisions  on  the  enlargement  of  the
European Union and declared Turkey a  candidate.  The prospect  of  becoming a  full
member  of  the  EU  and  the  decline  in  PKK’s  armed  operations  created  a  suitable
conjuncture that put pressure on the government to address the issue of human rights
and to undertake reforms that would have important consequences for the Kurdish
demands. Between 2001 and 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed seven sets of reform
packages  that  encompassed  constitutional  and  legal  amendments  to  meet  the  EU
membership  criteria.32 These  amendments  also  addressed some of  the  long-awaited
Kurdish  demands  for  cultural  rights.  In  August  2002,  a  change  in  the  Law  on  the
Teaching  of  Foreign  Languages  abolished  the  ban  on  teaching  Kurdish  in  private
classes. Another important improvement with regards to Kurdish cultural rights came
with  the  amendment  to  the  broadcasting  law,  which  allowed  for  ‘broadcasting  in
different languages and dialects Turkish citizens traditionally use in their daily lives.’33
This amendment opened the way for broadcasting in Kurdish in public and private
radio and TV stations. Despite many implementation problems on the ground, the legal
changes removed many restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. 
35 The expansions of Kurdish linguistic rights coincided with changing Kurdish strategies.
In  2002,  the  PKK  declared  that  it  promoted political  uprising  as  a  solution  to  the
Kurdish  problem.  As  Romano  (2006:  144)  points  out,  the  discourse  of  the  Kurdish
insurgency shifted to the language of human rights, democracy, and multiculturalism
as its military strength weakened and as it  needed to attract greater European and
international  support.  In  its  8th  congress,  the  PKK  announced  KADEK  as  its  only
legitimate representative and declared its  decision to undertake political  actions of
civil disobedience.34 Only a few months before this announcement, one of the major
newspapers  in  Turkey,  Hürriyet,  reported  that  the  Turkish  intelligence  agencies
warned the government about the PKK’s decision to begin a Kurdish naming campaign
as part  of  its  new civil  disobedience strategy.  Accordingly,  the PKK would mobilize
people to apply to courts to replace their Turkish names with Kurdish names as a way
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to create the Kurdish nation.35 In May 2002, the Ministry of the Interior sent a secret
circular warning to local administrators about a possible increase in Kurdish naming
and asked them to ensure that parents name their children in accordance with the
registration law. The circular granted governors wide discretion over decisions about
Kurdish naming without specifying how this authority should be used.36 This process
started another wave of contention between state officials and the Kurds. Any demand
for a Kurdish name was interpreted by state officials to be in line with the demands of
the PKK and could be perceived as a crime. The Registration Office in Mersin took a
family to court for giving the name Rojhat to their child.37 A lawyer who wanted to give
the name Robin to his newborn son could not register it in Diyarbakır.38 In Ardahan,
two fathers who wanted to give Kurdish names to their sons were sent to the State
Security Court on the charges of separatism and supporting a terrorist organization
through propaganda. The case was dismissed when the fathers’ relationship with the
PKK could not be established.39 In Diyarbakır, after surveying the civil registry records,
the gendarmerie prepared a list of 600 Kurdish names and sent it to the office of the
public  prosecutor,  which  immediately  started  investigations.  In  the  gendarmerie’s
document it was written that the campaign for Kurdish naming was part of the PKK’s
attempts of political struggle and that those who insisted on giving Kurdish names to
their children acted in accordance with the PKK’s directives. Similarly, in Izmir nine
people who gave Kurdish names to their children were taken to court for supporting
the  PKK.  According  to  the  Turkish  Human  Rights  Foundation,  a  total  of  76  name
annulment cases were brought to the courts in the year 2002. 40 
36 The mobilization of both state officials and the Kurds with regards to naming in the
post-2000 period underlines the difficulty of reconciliation, even at the cultural and
symbolic level, after periods of armed conflict. Ross (2007) emphasizes the importance
of ‘psychocultural interpretations’ in playing a causal role in ethnic conflicts. As Ross
argues, parties to the conflict do not act in a vacuum. Their interpretations of new
phases  in  a  conflict  are  conditioned  by  their  preexisting  beliefs,  experiences,  and
narratives: ‘The ambiguity of most events means they can be interpreted in different
ways, and to deal with this ambiguity groups turn to readily available interpretations
and narratives that then shape subsequent behavior. This,  of course, is what makes
ethnic  conflict  so  difficult  to  contain  and  manage  and why  ambiguous  events  are
selectively  interpreted  as  confirming  evidence  for  preexisting  beliefs.  Furthermore,
since many disputes involve parties with a long history of conflict, older grievances are
easily  appended  to  newer  ones  as  political  conditions  warrant.’  (Ross  2007:  25).  In
Turkey, the history of armed conflict prevented most state actors from seeing Kurdish
rights as a neutral category of minority rights, even after the decline in armed clashes.
Rather, the Kurdish demands for recognition of difference have been predominantly
perceived  as  demands  for  national  self-determination.  Especially  for  the  local
bureaucracy and the military that  had firsthand experience of  the war,  the pro-EU
reforms that began to lift restrictions on the use of Kurdish meant conceding to the
demands  of  the  Kurdish  insurgency  through  outside  pressure.  For  instance,  the
resistance of the military and the bureaucracy to the expansion of the cultural and
linguistic  space  for  expressions  of  Kurdishness  was  quite  apparent  in  the  cases  of
Kurdish broadcasting and private Kurdish teaching. Many human rights activists have
emphasized the bureaucratic complications that undercut the implementation of many
of the reforms and the gap between legislation and actual practice.41 
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37 Another process that underlined the difficulty of cultural reconciliation involved the
changing strategies of Kurdish activism. The pro-Kurdish activists’ efforts to mobilize
the Kurdish masses around naming were a consequence of the new cultural-linguistic
turn in the movement’s strategies. With the expansion of the legal-cultural space, the
post-2000  period  has  seen  renewed  efforts  to  develop  the  Kurdish  language  and
literature,  to  increase  the  volume  of  Kurdish  publications,  and  to  do  research  on
Kurdish history and culture. In this process, Kurdish activism also expanded its focus to
cultural  and  symbolic  contestation,  which  aimed  at  defining  Kurdishness  by
differentiating itself from Turkishness. For the Kurdish activists, names increasingly
became a tool  for the symbolic  creation of  Kurdish nationhood.  Prominent Kurdish
activist Naci Kutlay (1997: 327-328) states, ‘The identity search and struggle in recent
years showed itself, primarily and in its simplest form, in the use of Kurdish names.
Everybody looks for a Kurdish name for his/her children, more distinctly in the cities
with high Kurdish population density and less so in villages, and they take care that
these names be meaningful and pure Kurdish. Names chosen from Kurdish history and
geography began to be used, replacing the old traditional names.  At the same time
these names indicate the families’ patriotic character, advocating Kurdish identity.’ As
stated earlier, many Kurds and Turks used to share similar Muslim names in the past.
Kurdish activists’  naming campaign in  the post-2000 era,  nevertheless,  increasingly
took  a  nationalist,  exclusivist  character,  aiming  to  construct  a  clear-cut  boundary
between  Turkishness  and  Kurdishness,  and  thus  played  a  role  in  complicating  the
reconciliation process.  
38  In June 2003, the Turkish Parliament changed Article 16 of the Registration Law to
minimize contradictory interpretations of the article and to put an end to the naming
controversy. The article, which stipulated that children could not be given names that
contradict  with  the  ‘national  culture’  and  ‘Turkish  customs  and  traditions,’  was
changed. The amendment dropped the terms ‘national culture’ and ‘Turkish customs
and traditions,’ and stated that only names that disregard moral norms or offend the
public could not be given as first names. The following September, the government sent
a circular to the governors explaining the amendment and asking them to ensure that
any name could be registered in their province as long as it does not violate moral
norms and offend the public  and is  spelled in  accordance with the official  Turkish
alphabet. Soon after the amendment was passed, the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s
Party  (DEHAP)  and  the  Free  Society  Party  (ÖTP)  organized  a  campaign  for  the
registration of Kurdish names that include letters q, x, and w, which do not exist in the
official  alphabet.  Administrators  of  these  parties  collectively  applied  to  courts  to
replace their names with explicit Kurdish names such as Xemgin, Berxwedan, Warjin,
Qalferat,  and  Hêzîl  Avaşîn.  The  applications  reached  hundreds.  While  the  activists
declared that  they  wanted to  show the  limits  of  the  cultural  openings  and the  EU
reforms, they also introduced a set of Kurdish names, which were largely unknown to
the public before. Some of these names also had explicit nationalist connotations such
as  Şérwav [warrior],  Serxwebun [independence],  Welat  [motherland],  and Serhildan
[uprising].42 Neither the local courts nor the Court of Cassation allowed the registration
of Kurdish names with the letters that did not exist in the alphabet. In the rulings, the
courts stipulated that spelling of the names should conform to the rules of the Turkish
alphabet and that nonconformity could create administrative problems and confusion.
43 The registration of Kurdish names that are spelled with the letters in the official
alphabet, nevertheless, has created fewer problems since the amendment of the related
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article in the Registration Law and signified some change in Turkish state policies.44 In
2008, a father could register his newborn daugher’s name as Helin Kurdistan, which
meant ‘nest of Kurdistan,’ without much difficulty in Şanlıurfa.45
39 The insistence on the part of the Kurdish activists to use names that are distinctively
Kurdish and spelled with letters that do not exist in the official alphabet signified to the
public  the  Kurdish  activism’s  dissatisfaction  with  the  new  openings  and  its
unwillingness  to  accept  an  easy  conciliation.  The  recent  naming  controversy  also
underlined a Kurdification process that paralleled the earlier Turkification practices,
which aimed at purification of the language and the construction of an exclusive ethnic
identity. As  such,  it  indicates  a  mutually  transformative  interaction  between  state
policies  and  minority  activism.  The  naming  controversy  of  the  post-2000  period
underlines the potential of Kurdish nationalism to act like a mirror image of Turkish
nationalism, which in turn makes reconciliation over minority rights more difficult to
achieve. Practices of Kurdification reinforce a sense of ambivalence among state actors
vis-à-vis minority rights, lead them see such initiatives as steps for separatism rather
than acts for ethno-cultural  preservation,  and consolidate their resistance to policy
reforms.  Many  municipalities  in  the  Southeast  run  by  the  pro-Kurdish  Democratic
Society Party (DTP) began to push harder for Kurdification, which resulted in official
resistance at different levels of state institutions. In 2007, the Diyarbakır Municipality
published a 105-page reference book that listed Kurdish names. In Urfa, in the district
of  Suruç,  the  municipality’s  efforts  to  Kurdify  street  names  failed  as  a  result  of
litigation.46 In Diyarbakır, giving Kurdish names to parks was not allowed by the district
administration based on the grounds that the constitution stipulates Turkish as the
official language.47 Such a broad interpretation of the related article in the constitution
once  more  underlined  the  local  administrative  suspicions  of  the  Kurdish  cultural
demands and the non-linear character of state-minority relations.   
 
Conclusion
40 The Kurdish naming contention in Turkey suggests that the conventional approaches
to state-Kurdish relations remain inadequate in understanding state behavior. As the
Turkish state’s responses to Kurdish naming indicate, nation-building should not be
conceptualized as a linear and unchanging process. This process was in fact marked by
many instabilities and contradictions in state discourse and practice. Nevertheless, the
scholarship  on  state-minority  relations  remained  largely  unconcerned  with  how
different state institutions in Turkey could tackle the same issue in different ways. In
this study, I argue that different contexts in which state actors operated mattered in
formulation  and  implementation  of  policies.  Depictions  of  the  Turkish  state  as a
coherent and unitary actor may overlook some of the major factors that instigate the
Kurdish conflict. What we need is more ethnographic analyses of the Turkish state that
problematize its contradictory practices and attend to the practices of state institutions
at  the  local  levels.  This  study  is  only  a  step  towards  this  in  its  attention  to  the
fragmentations and divergent practices of different state actors. More nuanced and in-
depth studies of state institutions could give a clearer picture of struggles that take
place at the state level, explain why state actors behave the way they do, and clarify
how a state’s inconsistencies affect its relations with the society. 
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41 One question that this study raises relates to the decisions of the Court of Cassation vis-
à-vis  Kurdish  naming.  The  Court’s  tolerance  for  Kurdish  names  is  particularly
interesting because the Court has a reputation for endorsing a guardianship role to
protect  Kemalist  ideals  and  prioritizing  state  interests  over  individual  rights  and
freedoms.48 Therefore, the Court has not been consistently liberal on matters of human
rights, let alone Kurdish political and cultural rights. Under what circumstances and in
which issue  areas  the Court  observes  human rights  norms and acts  as  an agent  of
liberalization are important questions that go beyond the objectives and scope of this
study. These questions still await an answer and require further study on the decisions
of the Court of Cassation.
42 The  naming  controversy  also  underlines  how  state  policies  and  minority  activism
mutually condition one another. The Turkish state’s interventions over the years to
regulate and control  the private lives  of  the Kurds,  such as  what names to give to
children, gave new meaning and politicized many of the cultural expressions, as in the
case  of  Kurdish  naming.  The  general  official  discourse  on  Turkishness  and  the
Turkification  policies  influenced  the  manner  Kurdish  activists  imagined  Kurdish
identity  and  pushed  them  to  define  it  in  more  exclusivist  terms  with  clear-cut
boundaries. The increasing use of names by Kurdish activists as markers of divisive
identity coupled with the history of armed conflict, in turn, contributed to the official
resistance  against  Kurdish  naming,  especially  at  local  bureaucratic  levels.  One
implication  of  this  study  is  that  nation-building  should  be  seen  as  a  dynamic  and
interactive process, rather than a unidirectional one. Neither state actors nor minority
activists act in a vacuum. In other words, both state policies and minority strategies are
a  result  of  an  interaction,  in  which  earlier  acts  and  discourses  matter  for  the
formulation of  current  practices  of  both sides.  A  clean causal  relationship between
state  policies  and  minority  mobilizations  may  not  be  easily  established  with  an
approach that takes into consideration such mutual transformations. Nevertheless, an
interactive  and  contextual  understanding  of  state-minority  relations  could  better
illuminate the possibilities for reconciliation after long periods of conflict. 
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This article analyzes contention over Kurdish naming in Turkey. It explores why there has been
increased contention over naming between Kurdish activists and Turkish state authorities since
the 1980s. First, it underlines the incoherent state responses to the issue of Kurdish naming and
calls attention to the role of the local state officials in the escalation of naming controversy. In
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